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I INTRODUCTION 
 
On 2 July 1999, the Queensland Court of Appeal handed down its decision in 
Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt 
GmbH.1 The case, which concerned the legal framework governing an 
international commercial arbitration, became instantly infamous2
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 for 
1 [2001] 1 Qd R 461 (‘Eisenwerk’). 
2 Megens and Cubitt suggest that Eisenwerk (and an analogous Singaporean decision, John 
Holland Pty Ltd aka John Holland Construction & Engineering Pty Ltd v Toyo Engineering 
Corp (Japan) [2001] 2 SLR 262) ‘caused instant consternation in international arbitration 
circles’. See Peter Megens and Beth Cubitt, ‘Arbitrators’ Perspective: The Evolving Face of 
International Arbitration – The Past, the Present and the Future’ (2010) 13 International 
Arbitration Law Review 1, 5; see also Peter Megens and Beth Cubitt, ‘Meeting Disputants’ 
Needs in the Current Climate: What Has Gone Wrong With Arbitration and How Can We 
Repair It?’ (2009) 28(1) The Arbitrator & Mediator 115, 130. This observation (as made in 
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establishing the so-called Eisenwerk principle,3 pursuant to which the 
adoption of arbitration rules was said to constitute a displacement of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration.4 The 
decision was not well received in arbitration circles, with a number of 
academic commentaries criticising the approach taken in Eisenwerk to the 
interactions and relationships between the curial law governing an arbitration, 
and procedural rules which may be adopted for the purposes of conducting an 
arbitration.5
More than 10 years later, in August 2010, two different courts in two different 
Australian states had occasion to review the Eisenwerk principle. On 11 
August 2010, the New South Wales Supreme Court handed down its decision 
in Cargill International SA v Peabody Australia Mining Ltd.
 
6 Just nine days 
later, the Queensland Court of Appeal itself reconsidered Eisenwerk in 
Wagners Nouvelle Caledonie Sarl v Vale Inco Nouvelle Caledonie SAS.7
This case note comprises four main parts. In Part II, the legal background to 
the two recent decisions (that background consisting of the Eisenwerk case 
and Australia’s international commercial arbitration legislation) is reviewed. 
In Parts III and IV, Cargill International SA and Wagners respectively are 
examined. Finally, in Part V, the current status of Eisenwerk in Australian law 
(in light of these two decisions and recent legislative reforms) is considered. 
 Both 
decisions are notable not only because of the controversy surrounding the 
original Eisenwerk decision, but also because of the differing approach each 
takes to the Eisenwerk principle and the place that principle now occupies 
within an amended legislative regime for international commercial arbitration 
in Australia. 
                                                                                                                    
the first mentioned article by Megens and Cubitt) was noted by the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales in Cargill International SA v Peabody Australia Mining Ltd [2010] NSWSC 887 
(11 August 2010) (‘Cargill International SA’) [82]. 
3 See generally Part II below. 
4 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted 11 December 1985 
(the ‘Model Law 1985’).  
5 See, eg, Stephen Barrett-White and Christopher Kee, ‘Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Where 
the Seat of the Arbitration is Australia – How the Eisenwerk Decision Might Still be a 
Sleeping Assassin’ (2007) 24 Journal of International Arbitration 515. See also Björn Gehle, 
‘The Arbitration Rules of the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration’ 
(2009) 13 Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration 251, 256. 
6 [2010] NSWSC 887 (11 August 2010). 
7 [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) (‘Wagners’). 
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II THE LEGAL BACKGROUND — EISENWERK AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMENDMENT ACT 1989 
(CTH) 
The legal background to the Cargill International SA and Wagners decisions 
can be traced not only to the Eisenwerk case, but also further back to the 
International Arbitration Amendment Act 1989 (Cth). 
The International Arbitration Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) was a key piece of 
legislation in the modernisation of Australia’s international commercial 
arbitration laws. In particular, it amended the Arbitration (Foreign Awards 
and Agreements) Act 1974 (Cth) to implement the Model Law 1985 into 
Australian law,8 and renamed the Act as the International Arbitration Act 
1974 (Cth) while doing so. The Model Law 1985 is a model national law for 
the regulation of international commercial arbitration, formulated by the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, and can be 
domestically implemented by nations (at their option) either with or without 
amendment.9
The cases of Eisenwerk, Cargill International SA and Wagners arose, 
however, because of another provision, also inserted into the International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) in 1989 — the then new section 21, which 
provided that: 
 The International Arbitration Amendment Act 1989 (Cth) 
inserted the Model Law 1985 into Schedule 2 of the International Arbitration 
Act 1974 (Cth), and, through a new section 16(1) of that Act, gave it ‘the force 
of law in Australia’. 
If the parties to an arbitration agreement have (whether in the agreement or 
in any other document in writing) agreed that any dispute that has arisen or 
may arise between them is to be settled otherwise than in accordance with 
the Model Law, the Model Law does not apply in relation to the settlement 
of that dispute. 
This effectively established the Model Law 1985 as a default legal regime for 
the regulation of international commercial arbitration in Australia, but also 
preserved the right of parties to ‘opt out’ if they so wished. 
                                                 
8 It is noted that, pursuant to the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth), most of 
the amendments made to the Model Law 1985 by UNCITRAL on 7 July 2006 have now been 
incorporated into Australian law. However all three of Eisenwerk, Cargill International SA 
and Wagners were concerned with the original Model Law 1985. 
9 See, eg, Peter Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL 
Model Law Jurisdictions (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 2010) 1–3. 
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The final piece of the legal background to Cargill International SA and 
Wagners is the Eisenwerk decision itself, which concerned the interpretation 
and application of the then10 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 
21. The parties’ arbitration agreement referred to arbitration pursuant to the 
ICC Arbitration Rules11
Any dispute arising out of the Contract shall be finally settled, in 
accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, by one or more arbitrators designated 
in conformity with those Rules.
 in the following manner: 
12
According to Pincus JA, with whom Thomas JA
 
13 and Shepherdson J14 
agreed, this agreement constituted an ousting of the Model Law 1985 pursuant 
to the then International Arbitration Amendment Act 1974 (Cth) section 21.15 
In Pincus JA’s judgment, ‘by expressly opting for one well-known form of 
arbitration, the parties sufficiently showed an intention not to adopt or be 
bound by any quite different system of arbitration, such as the Model Law’.16
The controversy surrounding Eisenwerk stemmed from the fact that the Model 
Law 1985, through its article 19(1), permits party agreement on the procedure 
to be followed in an international commercial arbitration. This party 
agreement is often exercised in practice by way of agreement on a set of 
arbitration rules. The Model Law 1985’s non-mandatory rules can be 
contracted out of and displaced by party agreement on procedure, whilst its 
 
                                                 
10 As the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) has substituted a new s 21 into 
the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (by way of legislative response to the Eisenwerk 
case — see Part V below), this case note refers to the provision considered in Eisenwerk, 
Cargill International SA and Wagners as the ‘then’ International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) 
s 21. 
11 Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, adopted 1 January 1998.The 
Court noted that there were two versions of the ICC Arbitration Rules possibly relevant to the 
case before it — the Rules adopted on 1 January 1998 (those in force at the time the 
arbitration was commenced), and the Rules adopted on 1 January 1988 (those in force at the 
time the parties’ contracts were concluded) — but suggested (without analysis) that 
application of the 1998 Rules was ‘the preferable view’; see Eisenwerk [2001] 1 Qd R 461, 
465. While the temporal conflict of arbitration rules is a matter beyond the scope of Cargill 
International SA and Wagners (and, thus, this case note), for a recent analysis see Simon 
Greenberg and Flavia Mange, ‘Institutional and Ad Hoc Perspectives on the Temporal 
Conflict of Arbitral Rules’ (2010) 27 Journal of International Arbitration 199. 
12 Clause 13.1 of the parties’ contract, extracted in Eisenwerk [2001] 1 Qd R 461, 465. 
13 Ibid 471. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 466. 
16 Ibid. 
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mandatory rules will prevail over any party agreement.17 The conventional 
view in the arbitration world has been and continues to be that the adoption of 
a set of arbitration rules is not inconsistent with application of the Model Law 
1985, but rather is envisaged by the Model Law 1985 and can be properly 
accommodated within its legal framework.18 As the Eisenwerk court took a 
very different view of the relationship between the Model Law 1985 and the 
ICC Arbitration Rules, the case has sat uneasily with arbitration practitioners 
and academics over the course of the last decade. Indeed, the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General has gone so far as to note the ‘impact’ of Eisenwerk ‘on 
Australia’s reputation internationally’.19
III CARGILL INTERNATIONAL SA — THE NEW SOUTH 
WALES SUPREME COURT’S DECISION OF 11 AUGUST 
2010 
 
Cargill International SA was a decision of Ward J of the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, handed down on 11 August 2010. Given that Eisenwerk (a 
decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal) was not binding on the Court, 
Ward J was called upon to consider its persuasiveness in New South Wales in 
the course of rendering judgment. 
                                                 
17 See generally Binder, above n 9, 280 [5-013]–287 [5-032]. 
18 See, eg, Richard Garnett and Luke Nottage, ‘The 2010 Amendments to the International 
Arbitration Act: A New Dawn for Australia?’ (Sydney Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 10/88, September 2010) 4 (arguing that the result in Eisenwerk ‘was odd since it 
ignored the fact that the Model Law expressly contemplated that parties may include arbitral 
rules in their agreement consistently with having a Model Law arbitration’). See also Barrett-
White and Kee, above n 5, 524 (arguing that ‘the proposition outlined by Pincus JA in 
Eisenwerk is incorrect and … the Model Law and ICC Rules … are certainly reconcilable’); 
Luke Nottage and Richard Garnett, ‘Top 20 Things to Change in or Around Australia’s 
International Arbitration Act’ (2010) 6 Asian International Arbitration Journal 1, 26 (arguing 
that Eisenwerk ‘fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between (opt-in) [a]rbitration 
[r]ules, incorporated by reference into the parties’ arbitration agreement, and arbitration 
legislation (mostly now opt-out default rules, plus some mandatory rules)’. 
19 Robert McClelland, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in Australia: More Effective and 
Certain’ (Speech delivered at the International Commercial Arbitration: Efficient, Effective 
Economical? Conference, RACV City Club, Melbourne, 4 December 2009). See also Nottage 
and Garnett, ‘Top 20 Things to Change’, above n 18, 25 (noting that  Eisenwerk ‘has been 
another obstacle to having Australia being taken seriously as an arbitration venue’). 
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A The Facts 
The dispute before the Court in Cargill International SA arose out of a partial 
award rendered by an arbitrator on 7 December 2009.20 The substance of the 
dispute between the parties at arbitration concerned a claim by Excel Coal Ltd 
(known as Peabody Australia Mining Ltd at the time of litigation) for money 
owing in relation to deliveries of coal, and a counterclaim by Cargill 
International SA for demurrage.21 In the partial award, the arbitrator found 
that moneys were owing to Excel Coal Ltd, and also dismissed the 
counterclaim pursued by Cargill International SA.22
Cargill International SA initiated proceedings before the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales in an attempt to challenge the partial award of 7 December 
2009.
 
23
The first prong of Cargill International SA’s attack on the partial award was 
an application for leave to appeal that award pursuant to the Commercial 
Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) section 38(4)(b).
 It had two alternative bases for doing so, and the way in which its 
arguments were framed directly called into question the correctness of 
Eisenwerk. 
24 The second (and alternative) 
prong of Cargill International SA’s attack on the partial award was an 
application for an order of the Court that the partial award be set aside under 
article 34(2)(b)(ii) Model Law 1985,25
It can therefore be seen that Cargill International SA’s alternative claims for 
relief against the arbitrator’s award were based on both the domestic 
arbitration legislation of New South Wales, and also Australia’s international 
commercial arbitration legislation. In determining Cargill International SA’s 
challenge to the partial award, Ward J was required to determine which of the 
two legal regimes in fact governed the arbitration as ‘an initial jurisdictional 
question’.
 which provides that an award ‘may be 
set aside by the court … if … the court finds that … the award is in conflict 
with the public policy of this State [ie Australia]’. 
26
                                                 
20 Cargill International SA [2010] NSWSC 887 (11 August 2010) [1]. 
 This, in turn, required consideration of the Eisenwerk principle, 
21 Ibid [2]. 
22 Ibid [3]. 
23 Ibid [8]. 
24 See ibid [9]. It should be noted that the Parliament of New South Wales has recently enacted 
the Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) which came into force on 1 October 2010, 
repeals the 1984 legislation and establishes a new (domestic) regime for that state based on 
the Model Law. 
25 See Cargill International SA [2010] NSWSC 887 (11 August 2010) [10]. 
26 Ibid [8]. 
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given the arbitration clause on which the arbitration had been based in this 
case: 
In respect of matters which are to be referred to an Expert pursuant to the 
foregoing provisions of this clause 18 any appeals from the Experts [sic] 
decisions, and other disputes or claims arising out of or in connection with a 
Transaction and/or this Agreement, including any questions regarding its 
existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to International 
Arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce with any arbitration to be heard in Sydney in the English 
language before three arbitrators.27
B The Decision 
 
In considering the issue of whether or not the parties had opted out of the 
Model Law 1985 pursuant to the then International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) 
section 21, the Court undertook its analysis in two stages. 
1 The First Question — Is Adoption of Procedural Rules 
an Opting Out of the Model Law 1985? 
First, the Court directly considered the question of whether adoption of a set 
of procedural arbitration rules constitutes an implied agreement to oust the 
Model Law 1985 pursuant to the then International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) 
section 21. In doing so it directly considered the correctness of Eisenwerk. 
Ward J commenced analysis of this question by determining that an 
agreement to opt out of the Model Law 1985 pursuant to the then 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21 may be either express or 
implied.28 In this particular respect, her Honour was in agreement with the 
approach taken in Eisenwerk.29
                                                 
27 Clause 18.9 of the parties’ contract, extracted in ibid [39] (emphasis added by the Court). It 
should be noted that, in the arbitration as actually conducted, the parties’ dispute was heard by 
a sole arbitrator rather than three arbitrators (by agreement of the parties). See ibid [40], 
though nothing turns on this point for the purposes of this case note’s analysis. 
 However, her Honour disagreed with the more 
controversial aspect of the Eisenwerk decision. In relation to the Eisenwerk 
principle, her Honour opined: 
28 Ibid [37]. 
29 See ibid — ‘[t]o the extent that Eisenwerk … is authority for the proposition that the relevant 
opt out agreement can be one which is an implied agreement, then I would not conclude that it 
was plainly wrong.’ 
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Eisenwerk stands as authority for the proposition that, by expressly adopting 
a different ‘form of arbitration’ (there, that being the ICC Rules), parties 
will be taken to have shown a sufficient intention not to adopt the form or 
system of arbitration provided for under the Model Law (and that this is 
sufficient to amount to an opt-out agreement for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth Act).30
The Court did expressly note the deference which must be accorded by it to 
decisions of the Queensland Court of Appeal,
 
31
Ward J noted that the reasoning underlying the Eisenwerk decision was based 
on a number of premises: 
 however ultimately held that 
the reasoning employed in Eisenwerk was plainly wrong and should not be 
followed. 
What was the reasoning underlying the conclusion in Eisenwerk? Although 
reference was made by Pincus JA, first, to the perceived high level of 
inconvenience which would follow from a result that the parties are bound 
to both a Model Law arbitration and to an ICC arbitration; secondly to the 
fact that the former would not be an arbitration under the aegis of an 
established international organization, as the latter would be; and, thirdly, to 
the fact that the Model Law had not then been widely adopted, the basis for 
the conclusion that there had been an implied opting out of the Model Law 
was the perceived inconsistency and irreconcilability as between the 
provisions of the Model Law and those of the ICC Rules.32
In relation to the three ‘peripheral or background matters’, the Court noted:
 
33
• first, that ‘the perceived inconvenience … is overstated’ given that 
many of the Model Law 1985’s provisions are default provisions and 
thus ‘there is no reason why the two systems could not operate 
together’; 
 
• second, that this matter was not relevant ‘in pointing to the intention 
of the parties’ on the matter under consideration; and 
                                                 
30 Ibid [45]. This is a particularly interesting contrast to the interpretation of Eisenwerk given in 
Wagners, discussed in Part IV below. 
31 See Cargill International SA [2010] NSWSC 887 (11 August 2010) [48]–[53]. 
32 Ibid [60]. 
33 Ibid [61]. 
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• third, ‘apart from the question of how this would be relevant … the 
breadth of acceptance worldwide of the Model Law is now very 
different from that which was the case in 1999’. 
Further, in relation to the principal basis for the Eisenwerk decision, the Court 
emphasised the difference between the law governing an international 
commercial arbitration (the lex arbitri) and any chosen procedural rules of 
arbitration.34 After noting that ‘the decision in Eisenwerk has been roundly 
criticised for policy reasons … and as to the perceived failure to recognise the 
distinction between the lex arbitri and the procedural rules governing 
arbitration’,35 Ward J noted that such criticism ‘confirms the view I would in 
any event have formed … that there is a distinction between adoption of 
procedural rules and the application of the lex arbitri and that since the Model 
Law … permits the adoption of rules other than those for which it would in 
default of an alternative choice have provided, the choice by the parties of the 
ICC Rules to apply in their arbitration would not of itself constitute an opting 
out of the Model Law’.36
In its conclusion on the first question the Court held that the parties, ‘simply 
by referring their disputes to arbitration under the ICC Rules’, had not 
‘impliedly opted out of the Model Law’.
 
37 While adverting to the fact that the 
language used in the arbitration agreements in both Cargill International SA 
and Eisenwerk differed38 and that it was ‘possible’ to reach this conclusion 
‘simply by distinguishing the facts’ in the two cases, since Eisenwerk’s 
reasoning appeared to have its basis in the fact that the Model Law and the 
ICC Arbitration Rules were incompatible, it seemed to Ward J ‘that it is by no 
means clear that it can be distinguished in that fashion’.39
[I]nsofar as Eisenwerk is authority for the proposition that the adoption by 
the parties of procedural rules (such as the ICC Rules) to govern the conduct 
of the arbitration of their disputes amounts of itself to an implied agreement 
 Instead, Ward J held 
that: 
                                                 
34 Ibid [62]–[77]. 
35 See ibid [78]; citations to the academic commentaries and critiques considered by the Court 
can be found at [80]–[82].  
36 Ibid [83]. 
37 Ibid [87]. 
38 The arbitration agreement in Cargill International SA indicated that disputes would be 
‘referred to’ arbitration ‘under’ the ICC Arbitration Rules: see clause 18.9 of the parties’ 
contract, extracted in ibid [39]. On the other hand, the arbitration agreement in Eisenwerk 
referred to disputes being ‘finally settled, in accordance with’ the ICC Arbitration Rules: see 
clause 13.1 of the parties’ contract, extracted in Eisenwerk [2001] 1 Qd R 461, 465. 
39 Cargill International SA [2010] NSWSC 887 (11 August 2010) [88]. 
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to opt out of the Model Law … I have formed the view that that decision is 
plainly wrong and is one which should not be followed by this Court.40
2 The Second Question — Did Eisenwerk’s Existence 
Affect the Objective Intentions of the Parties? 
 
Second, the Court also considered the further question of whether the parties 
must have intended to oust the Model Law 1985 by adopting an arbitration 
clause in the form that they did, in knowledge of the then existing state of the 
law (represented by the decision in Eisenwerk). 
The Court approached this issue as a matter of pure contractual interpretation. 
Essentially, the argument of Cargill International SA was ‘put on the basis 
that the proper construction of a contract is to be determined by what a 
reasonable person in the parties’ position would have understood it to mean in 
the circumstances existing at the time of the contract’s execution’41 (which 
included the Eisenwerk case). The Court did suggest that, all other things 
being equal, ‘experienced practitioners in the area of arbitration would have 
been well aware by 2005 [ie the time of executing the agreement] of the risk 
that, by reference to Eisenwerk, an adoption of the ICC Rules might lead to 
the conclusion that they had opted out of the Model Law’.42 However, 
critically on this point, the Court held that the difference in wording between 
the clause used in Eisenwerk and the clause used in Cargill International SA 
compelled a different conclusion.43 While in Cargill International SA the 
parties were ‘referring their disputes for arbitration under the ICC Rules’, in 
Eisenwerk the parties were ‘providing for the settlement of their disputes in 
accordance with those Rules’.44 As this ‘(rather subtle) linguistic distinction’45 
was treated as being more than semantic and having potential substance,46
3 The Court’s Decision on the Facts of the Case 
 the 
Court held that the parties had not excluded the Model Law pursuant to the 
then International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21 on this basis. 
On the basis of its analysis of these two questions, the Court concluded that 
there was no agreement between the parties, pursuant to the then International 
                                                 
40 Ibid [91]. 
41 Ibid [92]. 
42 Ibid [95]. 
43 See ibid [108]. 
44 Ibid [109] (emphasis added by the Court). 
45 Garnett and Nottage, ‘The 2010 Amendments’, above n 18, 6. 
46 See Cargill International SA [2010] NSWSC 887 (11 August 2010) [109]. 
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Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21, to opt out of the Model Law 1985. This 
finding disposed of Cargill International SA’s first alternative argument.47 In 
relation to its second alternative argument based on the Model Law 1985, 
Ward J rejected the argument that there had been a denial of natural justice 
constituted by a failure of the arbitrator to deal with one of Cargill 
International SA’s arguments, and therefore found that there was no 
infringement of Australian public policy48 justifying interference with the 
partial award under article 34(2)(b)(ii) Model Law 1985.49 Cargill 
International SA’s application for relief against the arbitrator’s partial award 
of 7 December 2009 was dismissed.50
C Comments 
 
From an analytical point of view, perhaps the most interesting facet of Ward 
J’s decision in Cargill International SA is the way in which her Honour 
approaches the similarities and differences of that case vis-à-vis Eisenwerk. 
In relation to the first question considered by Ward J — whether the adoption 
of procedural rules constitutes an opting out of the Model Law 1985 — her 
Honour drew express attention to the fact that distinguishing Cargill 
International SA and Eisenwerk on the basis of the different wording of their 
respective arbitration clauses was ‘possible’.51 However, in her Honour’s 
opinion, it was ‘by no means clear’ that this distinction could be made (given 
the basis of the reasoning in Eisenwerk), thus requiring a decision by the 
Court on the correctness or otherwise of Eisenwerk.52
However, when Ward J came to consider the second question — whether 
Eisenwerk’s existence affected the objective intentions of the parties — a 
different approach was adopted. In this contractual interpretation context, her 
 On this first question, it 
appears that Ward J was of the opinion that Cargill International SA and 
Eisenwerk were not so different as to require the two cases to be 
distinguished. 
                                                 
47 Though the Court did go on to explain (by way of obiter dicta) that even if it had found the 
Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) applicable, an entitlement to relief would not have 
been made out: ibid [112]–[223]. 
48 The International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 19(b) clarifies that ‘a breach of the rules of 
natural justice’ in relation to the making of an award causes an award to be ‘in conflict with 
the public policy of Australia’. 
49 See Cargill International SA [2010] NSWSC 887 (11 August 2010) [241]. 
50 Ibid [252]. 
51 See ibid [88]. 
52 See ibid. 
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Honour was willing to distinguish Cargill International SA from Eisenwerk 
on the basis of the language used in their respective arbitration agreements.53
On one view, Ward J’s analysis simply gave differing treatment to 
Eisenwerk’s relevance to what are in reality two different legal issues. On 
another view, however, Ward J could be seen to (in effect) be holding 
Eisenwerk both indistinguishable and distinguishable at the same time. It 
remains to be seen how these questions will be approached by later cases. 
However, given her Honour’s extensive (obiter dicta) treatment of the merits 
of Cargill International SA’s case under the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 
(NSW),
 
54
IV WAGNERS — THE QUEENSLAND COURT OF APPEAL’S 
DECISION OF 20 AUGUST 2010  
 it is perhaps unlikely that this aspect of Ward J’s decision will have 
any bearing on the ultimate outcome of the dispute between Cargill 
International SA and Peabody Australia Mining Ltd. 
Wagners was a decision of McMurdo P, Muir JA and White JA of the 
Queensland Court of Appeal, handed down on 20 August 2010 — a mere nine 
days after Cargill International SA. By way of a case stated, their Honours 
were asked to reconsider the Eisenwerk principle, which had originated from 
the Queensland Court of Appeal itself. The principal judgment was delivered 
by Muir JA, with McMurdo P and White JA55
A The Facts 
 agreeing with Muir JA’s 
answers to the questions posed. 
The dispute before the Court in Wagners arose by way of a case stated for the 
Queensland Court of Appeal, pursuant to the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 
1999 (Qld) rule 483.56
The facts, as they were presented in the case stated, can be succinctly put. A 
contract was entered into between Wagners Nouvelle Caledonie Sarl and Vale 
 
                                                 
53 See ibid [108]. 
54 See ibid [112]–[223]. 
55 White JA’s judgment also offered some additional observations concerning the Eisenwerk 
decision – see Wagners [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) [49], and the discussion in Part 
IV(B) below. 
56 Wagners [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) [3]. 
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Inco Nouvelle Caledonie SAS on 29 June 2005, which included an arbitration 
clause.57
Any dispute or difference whatsoever arising out of or in connection with 
this contract shall be and is hereby submitted to arbitration in accordance 
with and subject to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In the absence of an 
agreement by the parties to the appointment of an arbitrator, the appointing 
person shall be the National President of the Institute of Arbitrators and 
Mediators Australia (IAMA). The administrating body shall be [IAMA]. 
There shall be one arbitrator, the language of the arbitration shall be 
English, the place of the arbitration shall be Brisbane.
 That clause provided as follows: 
58
Pursuant to this clause, Vale Inco Nouvelle Caledonie SAS initiated arbitral 
proceedings by issuing a notice of arbitration as required by the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules,
 
59 and a dispute arose between the parties as to whether the 
Model Law 1985 governed the arbitration.60
Three distinct questions were put to the Queensland Court of Appeal in the 
case stated: 
 This once again raised the issue 
considered in Eisenwerk. 
Question (a): Whether clause 8.17 of the Contract between the Appellant 
and the Respondent (‘the Litigants’), which relevantly provided ‘any 
dispute or difference whatsoever arising out of or in connection with this 
contract shall be and is hereby submitted to arbitration in accordance with 
and subject to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’, constituted, within the 
meaning of section 21 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (‘the 
Act’), an agreement between the Litigants ‘that any dispute that has arisen 
or may arise between them is to be settled otherwise than in accordance 
with the Model Law’ such that by the terms of section 21 the Model Law 
does not have any application to any part of the settlement of the dispute the 
subject of the arbitration between the Litigants … 
Question (b): Whether the principle contained in paragraph 12 of 
[Eisenwerk], namely ‘that, by expressly opting for one well known form of 
arbitration, the parties sufficiently showed an intention not to adopt or be 
                                                 
57 Ibid [4]. 
58 Clause 8.17 of the parties’ contract, extracted in ibid. 
59 Arbitration Rules formulated by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
adopted 28 April 1976. It is noted that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have recently been 
revised, resulting in the publication of the (new) Arbitration Rules formulated by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, effective 15 August 2010 – however, it was 
the original 1976 version of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in issue in Wagners. 
60 Wagners [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) [4]. 
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bound by any quite different system of arbitration, such as the Model Law’ 
(‘the Eisenwerk [p]rinciple’), is distinguishable from the facts of this case, 
by reason of the adoption by the Litigants of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules rather than the [ICC Arbitration Rules] … 
Question (c): If the answer to question (b) is ‘no’, whether the Eisenwerk 
[p]rinciple was correctly decided …61
The parties’ motivation in seeking to have these questions decided by the 
Court of Appeal appears from the judgment to be that ‘a binding and 
authoritative determination by the Court of Appeal as to the applicable 
supervisory law is essential to the efficacious conduct of the arbitration in 
respect of the underlying dispute [with it being] important for [the parties] to 
know at an early stage of the arbitration their rights of judicial review of any 
award of the [a]rbitrator’.
 
62
B The Decision 
 The contention that the parties had exercised their 
right under the then International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21 to opt 
out of the Model Law 1985 had been put forward by Wagners Nouvelle 
Caledonie Sarl in this case. 
The Court’s ultimate decision on the questions in the case stated can be 
summarised as follows: 
• in relation to question (a), concerning the issue of whether the parties’ 
arbitration agreement excluded the Model Law 1985, the Court 
answered ‘no’; 
• in relation to question (b), concerning whether the Eisenwerk 
principle was distinguishable on the basis that the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules had been chosen by the parties rather than the ICC 
Arbitration Rules, the Court indicated that it was ‘inappropriate to 
answer this question’; and 
• in relation to question (c), concerning whether the Eisenwerk 
principle was correctly decided (should the answer to question (b) be 
‘no’), the Court indicated that ‘no answer to this question is required’ 
given the answer to question (b).63
                                                 
61 Ibid [1] (emphasis in the original). 
 
62 Ibid [4] (paragraph [17] of the facts upon which the case was stated). 
63 Ibid [1]. 
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While this disposed of the issues in dispute for the parties, what is most 
interesting about Wagners is the Court’s reasoning, the way in which it 
interpreted Eisenwerk, and the ways in which these matters differed from the 
approach taken in Cargill International SA. 
It is clear from the judgment of Muir JA that the Court would have ideally 
liked to approach the case more squarely on the basis of contractual 
interpretation. Muir JA noted, before moving on to consider the three 
questions raised by the case stated, several key principles of contractual 
construction, including that: 
• the task involves ascertaining the objective intentions of the parties; 
• commercial contracts should be given commercially sensible 
interpretations; and 
• in both cases, the surrounding circumstances have importance.64
After doing so, Muir JA noted the ‘curious feature’ of the case stated, namely 
the fact that ‘nothing is disclosed concerning the parties, the background to 
the [c]ontract, let alone its terms and conditions’ — this leading his Honour to 
note that the Court’s task was ‘of a somewhat unusual and sterile nature’.
 
65
1 Question (a) of the Case Stated 
 
Muir JA did return to the issue of contractual interpretation in dealing with 
question (a) of the case stated. His Honour noted that whether or not the 
parties have opted out of the Model Law 1985 pursuant to the then 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21 is a matter of interpreting 
their arbitration agreement — and that the role, construction or categorisation 
of the Model Law 1985 as well as Parliament’s intentions (where they do not 
find expression in the clear language of the then section 21) are largely 
irrelevant.66
Muir JA was of the opinion that ‘[a] reasonable person with the attributes of 
the parties would have been aware that the [UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] 
and the Model Law were capable of operating together’, in light of the ‘wealth 
of commentary and other materials’ available.
 
67
                                                 
64 Ibid [25]. 
 Referring to article 1(2) 
65 Ibid [28]. 
66 Ibid [31]. 
67 Ibid [33]. 
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UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,68 and articles 19,69 2(d)70 and 2(e)71 Model 
Law 1985, the Court drew attention to the fact that the two bodies of rules 
were capable of effective interaction and that these four provisions ‘operate to 
prevent conflict between the two’.72 Against these considerations, the Court 
found that the parties had not excluded the Model Law 1985’s operation — 
though it did suggest (by way of obiter dicta) that a different result could 
conceivably be reached even in the case of an arbitration agreement similar to 
the one concluded by the parties, if such a construction was compelled by 
‘indications elsewhere in the agreement, or in the background to the 
agreement … or [where] the expressly adopted rules [are] so incompatible 
with the provisions of the Model Law as to compel the inference that the 
parties intended to exclude it’.73 Question (a) of the case stated was thus 
answered ‘no’.74
2 Questions (b) and (c) of the Case Stated 
 
In dealing with questions (b) and (c) of the case stated, Muir JA took a 
markedly different approach to the Eisenwerk decision from that taken by 
Ward J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. Muir JA held that ‘[w]hat 
is said to be “the principle contained in paragraph 12” of Eisenwerk is, in 
truth, no principle at all [but] is a conclusion as to the contractual intention of 
particular parties in particular circumstances’.75
                                                 
68 Art 1.2 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that ‘[t]hese Rules shall govern the arbitration 
except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the 
arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail.’ 
 Muir JA therefore treated the 
contentious finding in Eisenwerk as establishing not a point of law, but as 
being a finding of fact in the circumstances of that case. Given the ‘significant 
differences’ between the ICC Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, and that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Model 
69 Art 19 Model Law 1985 provides that the parties may agree on the procedure to be followed 
by the arbitral tribunal, and reserves a residual discretion to the arbitral tribunal over matters 
of procedure where the parties have not reached such an agreement (or reached an agreement 
on a particular procedural point in issue). 
70 Art 2(d) Model Law 1985 provides that ‘where a provision of this Law, except [A]rticle 28, 
leaves the parties free to determine a certain issue, such freedom includes the right of the 
parties to authorize a third party, including an institution, to make that determination’. 
71 Art 2(e) Model Law 1985 provides that ‘where a provision of this Law refers to the fact that 
the parties have agreed or that they may agree or in any other way refers to an agreement of 
the parties, such agreement includes any arbitration rules referred to in that agreement’. 
72 Wagners [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) [40]. 
73 Ibid [41]. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid [42]. 
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Law 1985 were intended by UNCITRAL (the body promulgating both) to 
work together, it was found that ‘[t]he decision in Eisenwerk is … plainly 
distinguishable.’76
This approach to Eisenwerk was further emphasised by Muir JA when 
pointing out that a court’s construction of a contractual provision in one case 
‘should rarely be regarded as propounding generally applicable principles of 
law’.
 
77 Indeed, Muir JA adverted to the fact that even identically worded 
contracts can be construed differently if the parties and surrounding 
circumstances in two cases differ.78 Muir JA also alluded to the fact that 
identically worded provisions can be given differing meanings over time 
where relevant circumstances change — noting as an example the fact that at 
the time Eisenwerk was decided 19 countries had adopted the Model Law 
1985, while at the time Wagners was decided the number of countries that had 
adopted the Model Law had grown to over 60.79
Interestingly (given current developments in the Australian international 
commercial arbitration environment), Muir JA quoted Lord Macmillan in 
Read v J Lyons & Co Ltd,
 
80 to the effect that the judiciary’s task is to decide 
the case before it and not ‘to rationalize the law of England’, with ‘[t]hat 
attractive if perilous field … left to other hands to cultivate’.81
In light of this analysis, Muir JA found that it was inappropriate to answer 
question (b) of the case stated; and that question (c), which was conditional 
upon question (b) being answered ‘no’, did not require an answer.
 Indeed, as is 
discussed in Part V below, these ‘other hands’ (being Parliament) have 
recently considered Eisenwerk as part of a review of the International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). 
82
                                                 
76 Ibid [46]. 
 Most 
interesting, to reduce the decision in Wagners to its essence, while finding that 
77 Ibid [43]. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid [44]. It should be noted for completeness that this statistic, reflected in materials 
available on the UNCITRAL website — see UNCITRAL, Status 1985 – UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration (2010) <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html>  — refers to countries which 
have enacted legislation based on either the original Model Law 1985 or the Model Law 1985 
as amended on 7 July 2006. This point was not noted by the Court, but, given that relatively 
more countries have adopted the original Model Law 1985 (and today, still more than the 19 
mentioned in Eisenwerk), it does not substantially affect the point made. 
80 [1947] AC 156. 
81 Ibid 175. 
82 Wagners [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) [47]. 
240 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 15 NO 2 
the factual conclusion reached in Eisenwerk need not be reached on its 
particular facts, the Queensland Court of Appeal was clearly not of the 
opinion83
3 The Additional Observations of White JA 
 that Eisenwerk itself had been wrongly decided. 
Before moving on from Wagners, it is interesting to note that White JA was 
willing to offer some further comments on Eisenwerk. White JA suggested 
that, given that the so-called Eisenwerk principle ‘continues to be cited in 
isolation from the facts, issues and arguments in the case, it does require some 
revisiting’.84 White JA suggested that she was in agreement with the 
observation in the arbitrator’s interim award that Eisenwerk ‘cannot properly 
be understood as meaning’ that ‘[a] mere agreement of the parties to adopt, or 
adapt, any arbitral procedural rules necessarily, or in all circumstances, leads 
to the legal conclusion that the parties have [opted out of the] Model Law’.85 
White JA also adverted to the fact that it appeared the Court in Eisenwerk had 
‘failed to grapple with the distinction between the lex arbitri … and the 
procedural rules adopted by the parties for the arbitration proper’.86 Her 
Honour suggested that the Model Law 1985 ‘can sit harmoniously’ with the 
dichotomy between the lex arbitri and procedural arbitration rules.87 
However, in her Honour’s ultimate decision, White JA agreed with the 
answers given to the case stated questions by Muir JA,88
C Comments 
 and her Honour’s 
additional comments (not being reflected in the reasoning in Muir JA or the 
judgment of McMurdo P) constitute obiter dicta only. 
The greatest practical relevance of Wagners lies in its potential implications 
for future cases, following its characterisation of the Eisenwerk principle as a 
factual determination. 
As is evident from the Court’s reasoning, and its answer to question (a) of the 
case stated, characterisation of the Eisenwerk principle as a factual 
determination allowed the later Queensland Court of Appeal to reach a 
contrary factual determination in a case involving the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
                                                 
83 Unlike Ward J of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Cargill International SA. 
84 Wagners [2010] QCA 219 (20 August 2010) [50]. 
85 Ibid [51]. 
86 Ibid [52]. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid [56]. 
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Rules, as opposed to the ICC Arbitration Rules which were in issue in 
Eisenwerk. 
However, aspects of the Court’s reasoning suggest that its implications may 
go even further — and may allow a court subsequently seized of a case 
involving an indistinguishably worded arbitration agreement to come to a 
decision at odds with Eisenwerk without having to find that it was incorrectly 
decided. This can be seen in Muir JA’s suggestion that ‘[w]ith the passage of 
time, circumstances may change so that a provision in a contract worded 
identically to a provision in a contract construed by a court some time before, 
may need to be construed differently’.89 Muir JA gives (as a specific example 
of a possibly changing circumstance) the increase in usage of the Model Law 
1985 so that it has come from being ‘something of a novelty to a common 
practice’.90
V EISENWERK — NOW AN ANSWERED QUESTION?  
 If a court in a later case (otherwise indistinguishable from 
Eisenwerk) found this changing circumstance to be of importance, it may be 
that the court could draw upon this passage of Muir JA’s judgment in order to 
avoid the result which eventuated in Eisenwerk without having to overrule 
Eisenwerk itself. 
The handing down of the judgments in Cargill International SA and Wagners 
is particularly timely because, in addition to Eisenwerk being reconsidered by 
the courts, Eisenwerk has also been recently reconsidered by the legislature. 
The Commonwealth Attorney-General launched a review of the International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) on 21 November 2008,91 and released a Discussion 
Paper92
                                                 
89 Ibid [44]. 
 identifying nine questions to be considered as part of the review. One 
90 Ibid. 
91 See generally Australian Government – Attorney-General’s Department, Review of 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (2010) <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/ 
agd.nsf/Page/Consultationsreformsandreviews_ReviewofInternationalArbitrationAct1974>. 
92 See Australian Government – Attorney-General’s Department, Review of the International 
Arbitration Act 1974 – Discussion Paper (2008) <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/ 
rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(3A6790B96C927794AF1031D9395C5C20)~Review+of+the+Internation
al+Arbitration+Act+1974+-+Discussion+Paper.pdf/$file/Review+of+the+International+ 
Arbitration+Act+1974+-+Discussion+Paper.pdf>. 
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of those questions, ‘Question D’, asked whether ‘the International Arbitration 
Act [should] be amended to reverse the Eisenwerk decision’.93
After receiving a number of submissions supporting amendment of the 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) in this respect,
 
94 the Commonwealth 
Government introduced the International Arbitration Amendment Bill 2009 
(Cth) into Federal Parliament on 25 November 2009. As eventually passed,95 
the amending legislation substituted a new International Arbitration Act 1974 
(Cth) section 2196
If the Model Law applies to an arbitration, the law of a State or Territory 
relating to arbitration does not apply to that arbitration. 
 which now provides: 
This new provision makes clear that international commercial arbitrations in 
Australia are now exclusively governed by the Model Law framework. Under 
the new International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21, it is no longer 
possible for parties to opt out of the Model Law. It is therefore not possible for 
the operation of the various state or territory Commercial Arbitration Acts to 
be enlivened (as an alternative to the Model Law), given that they will now 
always be displaced, in the case of international commercial arbitration, by 
the Commonwealth Constitution section 109. The new section 21, by 
replacing the old International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21, has as 
one of its purposes the legislative reversal of Eisenwerk.97
                                                 
93 See ibid [D]. In a recent article, Nottage and Garnett place the Eisenwerk issue amongst the 
top 20 law reform issues relating to international arbitration in Australia: see Nottage and 
Garnett, ‘Top 20 Things to Change’, above n 18, 24–25. 
 It came into force 
94 See, eg, Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, ACICA’s Submission – 
Attorney-General’s Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (2008) 10; Australasian 
Forum for International Arbitration, Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth): 
Submissions of the Australasian Forum for International Arbitration (2009) 5; Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators, Comments and Submissions upon a Review of the International 
Arbitration Act, 1974 (2009) 8; Australian National Committee of the International Chamber 
of Commerce, Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (2009) 2; Bruno Zeller, 
Review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 – Discussion Paper (nd) 1. Submissions 
made to the review can be accessed at Australian Government – Attorney-General’s 
Department, above n 91. 
95 As the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth); it should be noted that the new 
International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 21 was amended during its passage through 
Parliament. 
96 See International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) s 3 & Sch 1, cl 16. 
97 See Revised Explanatory Memorandum, International Arbitration Amendment Bill 2010 
(Cth) 16 [113]. 
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on 6 July 2010, the date upon which the amending legislation received royal 
assent.98
It can therefore be seen that as of 6 July 2010, the continuing relevance of 
Eisenwerk is an answered question. However, in the wake of Cargill 
International SA and Wagners, its authority concerning international 
commercial arbitrations conducted pursuant to arbitration agreements entered 
into before that date
 
99 remains unclear. While the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales in Cargill International SA unambiguously rejected the 
Eisenwerk reasoning, the Queensland Court of Appeal in Wagners 
characterised the decision in Eisenwerk as being one of fact and (while 
coming to a different conclusion on the facts of Wagners) did not go so far as 
to suggest that Eisenwerk was decided incorrectly. Given the arrangements 
with respect to the temporal applicability of the International Arbitration 
Amendment Act 2010 (Cth),100 the ‘uncertainty’ following Cargill 
International SA and Wagners ‘will persist for some time’.101
VI CONCLUSION 
 
The handing down of two state court decisions on a now repealed legislative 
provision may not seem, on its face, to be of great significance. However, 
viewing the decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Cargill 
International SA and the Queensland Court of Appeal in Wagners in this way 
is to ignore their true importance. 
The important implications of the Cargill International SA and Wagners 
decisions can be seen in the facts that: 
• both cases were handed down within nine days of each other; 
                                                 
98 See International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) s 2(1), item 8. As to the temporal 
application of the new International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) s 21, see Garnett and Nottage, 
‘The 2010 Amendments’, above n 18, 13–16. 
99 It is noted that questions have been raised as to the effect of the International Arbitration Act 
1974 (Cth) s 30 on the date upon which certain provisions amended pursuant to the 
International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) become effective. See generally Garnett 
and Nottage, ‘The 2010 Amendments’, above n 18, 13–16. 
100 See generally the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth) ss 2(1) & 3; Sch 1, Pt 
2. 
101 Garnett and Nottage, ‘The 2010 Amendments’, above n 18, 7. 
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• the New South Wales Supreme Court and the Queensland Court of 
Appeal both took very different approaches in their reconsideration of 
the Eisenwerk case; 
• Ward J in the New South Wales Supreme Court was willing to decide 
that Eisenwerk was plainly wrong and should not be followed by the 
courts in that State; 
• the Queensland Court of Appeal was willing to come to a different 
decision from the one in Eisenwerk on the facts of the case before it, 
but unlike Ward J was not prepared to decide that Eisenwerk was 
wrongly decided given that (in its opinion) the Eisenwerk principle 
was in truth only a factual determination; and 
• despite legislative intervention in the form of a new International 
Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21, the old section 21 (considered 
in Eisenwerk) will continue to apply to international commercial 
arbitrations conducted pursuant to arbitration agreements concluded 
before 6 July 2010. 
Eisenwerk has been a controversial decision in Australia over the last decade, 
and after the different approaches taken to its reconsideration in Cargill 
International SA and Wagners, its ripple effects may continue to be felt for 
some time. 
 
